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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines how the process of constructing knowledge has affected the 
institutional treatment of people with impairments and the construction of an ethic of disability. Its 
primary finding is that the process of creating knowledge in a number of contexts is influenced more 
by traditions and the biases of authors in order to signify moral and intellectual superiority, than by a 
desire to improve the lives of disabled people. Furthermore, this article finds that certain 
impairments are theorised using very particular methodological assumptions, as they hold what are 
felt to be greater intellectual value, and are associated more with morality through the perception 
and understanding of what is felt to be nature. The article presents a case study of such an 
epistemological process, which discusses the development of philosophies on a Western 
understanding of three impairments: blindness, deafness and learning impairments. It is argued that 
knowledge leading to the development of separate institutions for these impairments was based on 
severe forms of reductionist materialism and metaphysics, which were heavily influenced by social 
and cultural prejudices. 
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